Investigation Reveals That Government Regulators Ignored 'Numerous Weaknesses' in Banks' Risk Management Plans
While everyone watches the AIG spectacle unfold in the House, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) is laying some shocking truths on the Senate Banking Committee in a little-noticed report.
The GAO, Congress' independent investigative bureau, spent three months probing the performance of government financial regulators in advance of a hearing today on "lessons learned in risk management oversight." What investigators found -- summarized in a 35-page report that's not yet available on its website -- was a system held captive by the banking industry.
The GAO's report concluded that "regulators had identified numerous weaknesses in the institutions' risk management systems before the financial crisis" -- but did nothing "until the crisis occurred because the institutions had strong financial positions and senior management had presented the regulators with plans for change."
Here are some of the distressing conclusions uncovered by the investigation (emphasis mine):
Some regulators found that institutions' senior management oversight of risk management systems had significant shortcomings, such as a lack of a comprehensive means to review enterprise-wide risks, yet some regulators gave the institutions satisfactory assessments until the financial crisis occurred. ...[S]ome regulators found that institutions had not tested the assumptions in models used to evaluate risks -- such as the likelihood of a borrower to default -- but, for at least one institution, examiners did not prohibit the institutions from using untested models nor did they change their overall assessment of the institutions' risk management program based on these findings.
In a 2006 review, the Federal Reserve found that none of the large, complex banking institutions it reviewed had an integrated stress testing program that incorporated all major financial risks enterprise-wide, nor did they test for scenarios that would render them insolvent. ...
Even when regulators perform horizontal examinations across institutions in areas such as stress testing, credit risk practices, and the risks of structured mortgage products, they do not consistently use the results to identify potential systemic risks.
In addition, in 2005, when the Federal Reserve implemented an internal process to evaluate financial stability issues related to certain large financial institutions, it did not consider risks on an integrated basis and, with hindsight, we note that it did not identify in a timely manner the severity of the risks that ultimately led to the failure or near failure of some of these institutions and created severe instability in the overall financial system.
The GAO's study examined regulatory behavior at the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
















Earlier this week, on the very day that Treasury regulators descended to conduct Geithner's "stress test" Wells Fargo Chairman and brain behind Wells/Wachovia's Zombie Bank Marriage, complained that the stress test was "assinine", that his bank's regulators regular stress tested Wells Fargo
I wonder why he's suddenly so upset
March 18, 2009 3:06 PM | Reply | Permalink
Really? So Bernanke's Fed, FDIC, etc - no one thought it was maybe a bad idea for these Banks to carry a debt ratio as high as 35:1
And Treasury? Oh wait - it was Hank Paulson that requested the debt ratio increase allowance.
They knew - and they all looked the other way. That is why we do not trust Bernanke and Geithner, the AIGs, the Goldman Sachs people and The Citigroups, etc.
March 18, 2009 3:28 PM | Reply | Permalink
Great catch, Elana, and thank you for summarizing and quoting it for us.
The repugs are right - regulation is to blame for the meltdown. Lax regulation that is.
March 18, 2009 3:45 PM | Reply | Permalink
This is one small bit of the panoramic picture, but I doubt the failure of government regulators was the real reason for the crisis. Congress simply cannot--as an institution--admit any sort of blame.
The Glass-Steagall Act from 1932 was repealed in 1999. Here's what the Library of Congress had to say about the reason for the original act: In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, bankers and brokers were sometimes indistinguishable. Then, in the Great Depression after 1929, Congress examined the mixing of the “commercial” and “investment” banking industries that occurred in the 1920s. Hearings revealed conflicts of interest and fraud in some banking institutions’ securities activities. A formidable barrier to the mixing of these activities was then set up by the Glass Steagall Act."
This barrier was removed in 1999. This barrier needs to be revisited and perhaps revised to cover an insurance company (like AIG) who ventures into financial products, essentially investment. If there were difficulties with the original act in our modern world, then these need to be fixed. Apparently we've thrown out the baby with the bath water with this one.
The second issue is the unregulated derivatives market. Government doesn't regulate this market and so we rely on the after-the-fact cleanup. Enron had an energy derivatives market and now we're cleaning up another unregulated derivatives market. Congress needs to enact regulatory framework to cover this market.
The third issue Obama alluded to today--and that's to provide government with the tools needed when a company is rescued by the government to prevent economic chaos. We certainly have established law if bankruptcy occurs. We need new laws and new tools when the government intervention falls short of bankruptcy. This would allow the government to renegotiate any onerous contracts--like the retention contracts that have caused so much anxiety.
We are now reaping the whirlwhind of unthinking deregulation and a deadly reliance on the "free market". Alan Greenspan learned his lesson about the correction of the free market. It's time we relearned the same lesson.
Congress, get off your collective a$$es and get to work on these issues instead of pandering to a mob instinct. Don't be so damned worthless.
March 18, 2009 3:52 PM | Reply | Permalink
Co-sign. I remember listening to All Things Considered reporting on the repeal of Glass-Stengel while I was trying to get out of my office parking garage and thinking "oh yeah, that's gonna work. Work like a dry drunk insisting he can now handle one or two drinks, that is."
March 18, 2009 4:01 PM | Reply | Permalink
Double co-sign. I don't remember where I was, but I basically had the same thoughts. And . . . it only took ten years for the whole thing to blow up and put us on the brink of another depression. Throw in all the hyper consolidation over the last 20 years as well so that the entities became like lumbering elephants "too big to fail." Brilliant f'n move. Just brilliant.
March 18, 2009 5:42 PM | Reply | Permalink
That would be Glass-Steagall, but whatever. Double, triple, or whatever, co-sign.
What I don't get is -- in your dogged defense of Geithner and your unstinting contempt for those who would voice criticism of him, or Summers -- do you not realize the role the Rubin-Summers-Geithner crowd played in getting G-S repealed?
March 18, 2009 10:03 PM | Reply | Permalink
The real culprits are those who wrote the law, those who voted for it and the one who signed it into law. It's not just a nice phrase when we all say we are a nation of laws, you know.
Everyone else is expressing an opinion. And I trust Obama--you know, the guy who actually said today that the president was responsible, even if he didn't cause the mess.
Congress and the Prez are responsible when a law gets repealed (1999 was the date).
March 19, 2009 3:25 AM | Reply | Permalink
If you ignore who was instrumental in advising the Prez, you're a fool. Especially if those people find themselves once again in the curent Administration.
March 19, 2009 11:09 PM | Reply | Permalink
And who pushed thru the repeal of Glass Steagall? Phil Gramm the then head of the Senate Banking Committee with the compliance of Robert Rubin Clinton's Treasury Secretary. Nice work Phil. We're not a nation of whiners anymore, we're a nation of poor people.
March 18, 2009 4:29 PM | Reply | Permalink
And who pushed thru the repeal of Glass Steagall? Phil Gramm the then head of the Senate Banking Committee with the compliance of Robert Rubin Clinton's Treasury Secretary. Nice work Phil.
Quoted, with emphasis added, for truth.
And, it must be added, who was Clinton's Treasury Secretary at the time the Glass-Steagall repeal was passed: Larry Summers.
Moreover, as pointed out by Frank Rich among others, Geithner is very much in the same pack.
March 18, 2009 9:57 PM | Reply | Permalink
Like I said, "among others." Michael Hirsh, reporting in Newsweek on the conspicuous absence of Joseph Stiglitz from Economic Team Obama:
Please, Summers-Geithner fans, just let me know how many Friedman units I'm supposed to give these brilliant masters of finance to get it right, OK?
March 18, 2009 9:58 PM | Reply | Permalink
Those'd be Milton Friedman units, right?
Call 'em MFUs to avoid confusion...
March 18, 2009 10:18 PM | Reply | Permalink
Nope. Thomas Friedman.
http://www.dkosopedia.com/wiki/Friedman_Unit
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedman_(unit)
March 19, 2009 1:28 AM | Reply | Permalink