The International Swaps & Derivatives Assocation: A $1.9M Lobbying Team
Josh observed earlier that the International Swaps & Derivatives Association was one of the major lobby groups helping to ensure that derivatives contracts got special repayment privileges from creditors under the 2005 bankruptcy bill. Which got me wondering ... the ISDA must be shaking in its loafers over the possibility of stronger regulation passing Congress this year. Which D.C. lobbyists are in their corner?
Here's what I found: a healthy $1.9 million in lobbying spending for 2008, more than twice as much as embattled bank UBS and comparable to the lobby bills of Credit Suisse, one bank heavily tied to derivatives trading and other complex financial instruments.
The lobbyist lineup for ISDA looks like a staff alumni list for top GOPers (and a few Dems):
Greg Zerzan, Robert Pickel: The ISDA's two in-house lobbyists reaped the bulk of the group's lobbying spending, at $1.5 million. Zerzan is a former senior Treasury Department official under George W. Bush, as well as an ex-counsel to two House committees with a key role in the derivatives debate. Pickel was a former counsel to the Amerada Hess oil company before joining the ISDA.
Brant Imperatore, BGR Group: A former counsel to ex-House Financial Services Committee Chairman Mike Oxley (R-OH). BGR was co-founded by now-Mississippi Gov. Haley Barbour (R), an ex-RNC chairman and former Bush fundraiser Lanny Griffith.
Don Moorehead, Kirsten Wegner: Both lobby for Patton Boggs, where Moorehead is a 25-year veteran and Wegner is a recent arrival who specializes in giving clients "strategic advice" on the government's financial bailout.
J. Patrick Cave, Ben DuPuy, Alexander Sternhell: All three hail from the Cypress Group, which was founded in 2005 with the counter-intuitive mission of lobbying and affordable housing (the firm's realty arm won a contract to rebuild New Orleans homes after Hurricane Katrina). Cave is a former aide to ex-Rep. Richard Baker (R-LA), a senior House Financial Services member, while Sternhell is a former Democratic aide on the Senate Banking Committee. DuPuy is a former aide to Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-AL) and an ex-lobbying for the National Rifle Association.
Alan Sobba, Sobba Public: Until 2007, he served as external affairs director for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission -- the body charged with regulating (or not regulating, as the case may be) derivatives trading. His duties included supervising the agency's contacts with Congress.
Edward Rosen, Cleary Gottlieb: Has advised the biggest Wall Street trade associations in Washington, including the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, the Securities Industry Association, and The Bond Market Association.




















The "International Swaps & Derivatives Association." Geez, talk about branding problems. I'm sure it seemed all very innocuous when the started, but now it's like "The Toxic Waste Dumpers Association" or "The Transfat Council" or "Baby Seal Clubber Alliance." I'll bet everyone who's up for reelection in 2010 is lining up to be seen with them.
March 6, 2009 2:51 PM | Reply | Permalink
"Here's what I found: a healthy $1.9 million in lobbying spending for 2008, more than twice as much as embattled bank UBS and comparable to the lobby bills of Credit Suisse, one bank heavily tied to derivatives trading and other complex financial instruments."
UBS and Credit Suisse are both ISDA members, so those comparisons don't really say much. The major dealer banks have long dominated the ISDA -- just look at the makeup of the board of directors. There weren't any "buy side" representatives (the dealer banks are "sell side") on the ISDA's board until just a few weeks ago -- the first legitimate buy side board members in the ISDA's 20+ year history.
Before you paint the ISDA as some sort of Evil Cabal, remember that it's both a lobby group and a trade group. When the ISDA is in Lobbying Mode, it's as annoying as any other interest group with an agenda, and is a legitimate target for criticism. But when it's in Trade Association Mode, it usually does excellent work, most of which occurs behind the scenes.
Finally, the bankruptcy carve-out is necessary because it allows for multilateral close-out netting (which is critically important); it wasn't some cynical effort to screw Main Street or anything. I know it's tempting to play the populist card here, but you'd be advised to avoid that temptation. TPM is above that.
March 8, 2009 1:47 AM | Reply | Permalink
With the greatest respect, EOC...
...what I've learned as I've educated myself re: the whole financial thing we're going through...is that part of the smoke and mirrors used in "The Game" comes from terminology that: a.) few if any "normal" people can understand; b.) may not even make sense to many whose backgrounds are in economics; and c.) masks the utter convolutedness of "deals," scams, schemes and the like.
Which means: If it can't be said or explained clearly, understandably, without making most of us throw our hands in the air and give up...it's probably not such a good thing that's going on.
Case in point: When you state: "...the bankruptcy carve-out is necessary because it allows for multilateral close-out netting (which is critically important)" maybe it would be a good idea to tell us what a "carve out" is, what "multilateral close-out netting" is, and why it's "critically important." Otherwise, there's no way for someone like me to know whether what you're saying is legit, or whether it's the language of Orwell. (And it's obvious we've had an excess of the big O's cadence running the show for quite a while now.)
Thanks!
March 8, 2009 8:21 AM | Reply | Permalink
I'm pretty sure that post you reacted to was intended to be satire. I know it cause me to chuckle quite a bit. It was very well done.
March 8, 2009 11:33 AM | Reply | Permalink
Apparently it wasn't satire. The guy was being serious. Welcome to the 21st Century, the age where it has become almost impossible to tell what is spoofed from what is real...
March 9, 2009 1:02 AM | Reply | Permalink
Sorry for the jargon -- when you've been hearing and using Wall Street jargon every day for 15+ years, at some point you forget which phrases everyone understands and which ones constitute impenetrable jargon.
As for the definition of "multilateral close-out netting" and why it's "critically important," see Ontologically Impaired's terrific explanation below, to which I have nothing to add.
March 8, 2009 8:40 PM | Reply | Permalink
Sincerely meant: Thanks for the attempt.
Some kindly feedback: After following your link to Onto Imp. and reading tidbits like "Settlement risk is the risk that a counterparty does not deliver a security or its value in cash as per agreement when the security was traded after the other counterparty or counterparties have already delivered security or cash value as per the trade agreement"...just one thought:
Huh????
What this says to me...maybe both you and Onto Imp. are so deep in the dung, so accustomed to the dung that you're unable to see where you're standing (and what you're standing in). The only phrase that comes to mind (and I truly don't use this kind of language - really, I don't): mental masturbation.
Just an FYI: When Josh writes something about this, I understand it. And that incredible article in the NYTimes by business writer Joe Nocera (Feb. 27?) about this whole AIG thing - superb. Pretty easy to follow. And any jargon used was carefully explained.
Suggestion: If you want to convince some of us that what we're picking up isn't the whole story, or that we're somehow misunderstanding, perhaps a jargon-free zone???
I wish you well.
P.S. I think Josh's reputation is doing just fine.
March 8, 2009 11:35 PM | Reply | Permalink
Good advice.
BTW, here is Barry Ritholz' take on the AIG solution: http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/03/solvent-insurer-insolvent-insurer/
Worth a look if you have a few minutes. It makes sense to me.
March 8, 2009 11:55 PM | Reply | Permalink
Very helpful, easy-to-understand link. Thanks! (And the posts on that site: excellent.)
March 9, 2009 12:19 AM | Reply | Permalink
Thank you, you have expressed my own thoughts very well. When a concept cannot be explained in plain English (not necessarily briefly, but at least in jargon-free sentences), then I begin to suspect that either the person trying to explain it doesn't fully understand it either, or it never made any sense to begin with.
If a concept cannot be explained clearly, then how can anyone expect to think about it clearly?
March 9, 2009 1:00 AM | Reply | Permalink
Well stated "It robbed 100's of millions of people of 100's of billions of dollars. The people who ran it are bankrupt...morally and leadership-wise. They pocketed the massive profits. They saddle us with the massive debts. They ride off barely chastened...let alone prosecuted.
Stimulous packages is simply a joke. Our elected leaders should be thrown out. I'm a convert to term limits for the house and senate. 8 years for congress and 12 for the senate. To have career politico's destroy our country while funding their pet projects is also morally wrong. Let's get rid of everyone who voted "yes' for this rape of American Taxpayers.
March 10, 2009 12:43 AM | Reply | Permalink
Excuse me, EOC, but these markets should not even exist. Don't bore me with with the fine-tuning.
March 8, 2009 12:01 PM | Reply | Permalink
Who are the Dems? Anyone interesting?
March 8, 2009 1:48 AM | Reply | Permalink
Have to agree with EOC, there - the close out netting provisions were indeed intended to guard against systemic risk. Having been a lawyer involved in this business (albeit the "buy-side")for over 20 years, my recollection is that ISDA sought to address risk to the financial system in good faith - and a major reason why governments of all political persuasions held off from regulation was because they, too, felt ISDA and similar groups were doing God's work. The fear was that wide-spread payment failures was a contagion risk, and this movie had been seen before (Herstatt risk: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Settlement_risk). Josh may need to do a bit more research here if he really wants to break out the tar and feathers -- hey, it's your credibility, TPM, not mine, and I have no particular axe to grind - I'm as blue (as opposed to red) as they come.
March 8, 2009 5:50 AM | Reply | Permalink
OK, I'm among the great unwashed. Part of the problem associated with swaps and derivatives is the obscurity of the language and possibly even the processes. Could someone explain simply what multilateral close-out netting is and why it is so critically important? EOC? Also the link to Herstatt risk (whatever that is) isn't yet up to help enlightenment. Ontologically Impaired? Also, has the provision been useful in eliminating systemic risk during the present situation? An example, please.
Although the bankruptcy bill may not have been a cynical carveout for treatment of swaps and derivatives ahead of other creditors, the bill certainly had the main effect of a cynical effort to screw Main Street to benefit the credit card companies who have been complicit in encouraging the nation to live beyond their means. It's another one of the bills which contributed to the meltdown we are experiencing. It was the direct result of the effectiveness of lobbying organizations like ISDA in achieving results which are only support special interests.
Perhaps if we redefined usery as interest rates and fees in excess of 15 or 18 percent, the credit card people would have been more careful in their lending. I think they've just made the fees and interest exorbitant enough that they could survive any foreseeable level of default. We may now be beyond that level of default.
March 8, 2009 8:09 AM | Reply | Permalink
The first I ever heard of the ISDA was last week when Robert Pickel appeared on the Diane Rehm Show. Of the three guests she had on, he was the one who was most inclined to get into the Orwellian banker-talk to "explain" his position. And his primary concern seemed to be that the gov't should not react to our present problem by considering increased regulation of CDS's nor other derivatives nor hedge funds.
I can become overwhelmed in the jargon pretty quickly when trying to understand this mess on Wall Street, and I am told that many of the wizards themselves who bought these instruments didn't quite understand what they were purchasing.
But all I really needed to know was that a CDS is little more than purchase of insurance for something for which you, yourself, have no personal fiscal interest. Kinda' like buying a $350,000 life insurance policy on your neighbor. Just how much mischief might that introduce to a relationship, eh? "Hey, Mac! Wanna' help me clean my gutters?"
Look at the relationships on Wall Street where credit has dried up because no one trusts the system anymore. What more do you need to know about the "benefits" offered by the ISDA Trade Group/Lobbying Assn, despite their efforts to whitewash this casino gambling with no rules in which they have participated for far to long.
March 8, 2009 8:47 AM | Reply | Permalink
I've also heard the same thing re: some of those who are in the industry themselves who couldn't have told you what this stuff was about because they themselves didn't understand it - too obscure, hard to pin down, full of mumbo-jumbo sleight-of-hand legal-eeze. And hoppycalif2, in a similar post, adds: "Much of the mangled language involved in this discussion was developed to get around the fact that what was involved was pure gambling, as opposed to investing. The rest was intended to obfuscate so as to prevent anyone from noticing that laws were being ignored, if not outright broken."
Bingo.
P.S. Loved your take out an insurance policy on your neighbor analogy! With one addition, based on my current understanding: It would be like taking out an insurance policy on a neighbor you suspected had a terminal illness. Not a question of if...only a question of when.
March 8, 2009 11:46 PM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks, Barbyrah, for the reply.
I believe you are correct in your appraisal of CDS' being purchased in anticipation of the failure of an enterprise in which the holder of the "policy" has no personal interest. It nevertheless creates troubling scenarios wherein the policyholder can conceivably act to hasten the demise of the enterprise in effort to receive payout on their wager.
Come to think of it, did anyone check see how many CDS notes Paulson and Co. held on Lehman Bros.?
There appear to be no real white hats on Wall Street. It's therefore troubling for me to see Obama's continued reliance upon these gamblers to somehow correct the mistakes they have created - and profited from so nicely!
March 9, 2009 12:08 AM | Reply | Permalink
You are missing my point, jimbonita. It’s not that I’m defending the banks or the regulators. And I am not claiming the system of risk protection worked (as built by ISDA) – obviously it didn’t work. But . . . Josh is assuming motivations based on (1) the self-interest of the parties involved (which is legitimate up to a point particularly if such parties become empowered to act unilaterally - but I would say that government regulators under all administrations were more than happy to aid and abet) and (2) with the benefit of hindsight (which is illegitimate). I have a problem with faux-populist outrage that is built up on this basis.
I’m fine with attacking those responsible based on the results – but I’m not comfortable with attacking peoples’ motivations until it is shown they were intentionally acting contrary to the interests of the financial system. Also, while they may have been incompetent (which seems to be self-evident), I would suggest the greater failure was with the entire risk-based capital regime intended to force banks to recognize and protect against risks on a dynamic basis. And here I do believe self-interest trumped common sense. Basle II is dead – Basle III is a train that is urgently leaving the station because the regulators and governments that so gladly wore the mantle of the Reagan (deregulation) Revolution are now finally waking up.
Anyway, here is some more context to help explain what ISDA was trying to do (competently or otherwise):
Settlement risk is the risk that a counterparty does not deliver a security or its value in cash as per agreement when the security was traded after the other counterparty or counterparties have already delivered security or cash value as per the trade agreement.
You have to keep in mind that the ISDA master agreement was intended to cover virtually any kind of OTC (over-the-counter) transaction. This includes box-standard spot, forward and other kinds of foreign exchange transactions. And here is where we have a real-world example which may give you an idea of the kind of risks ISDA thought it was guarding against in order to protect the stability of the financial system.
Foreign exchange settlement risk (i.e., cross-currency settlement risk) is also called "Herstatt risk" after the German bank that made that risk (in)famous. On 26th June 1974, the bank's license was withdrawn by German regulators at the end of the banking day (4:30pm local time) due to a lack of income and capital to cover liabilities that had come due. Some US banks that had outstanding foreign exchange transactions with Herstatt (spot settles on a T+2 basis) had already paid Deutsche Marks to the bank during the day in anticipation of receiving US dollars the next day in Germany or later the same day in the US – such are the risks of what is known as “gross settlement”. And indeed after 4:30 pm in Germany and 10:30 am in New York, Herstatt stopped all dollar payments to counterparties, leaving the counterparties unable to collect their payment. The closing of Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1990, Bank of Credit and Commerce International in 1991, and Barings in 1995 resulted in similar losses for counterparties in the foreign exchange market.
The concern, therefore, is indeed a form of domino effect. “Net” settlement basically extinguishes the parties’ gross settlement obligations so there is only one “net” payment from one party to the other. One party is the winner and one is the loser, depending on who is “in the money”. This obviously greatly reduces risk to the financial system (at least in theory) by reducing gross exposure on notional values of OTC contracts. Risk-based capital rules consequently endorsed this approach and permitted banks and others to reduce risk-based capital requirements accordingly. To the extent exposures were collateralized, the idea was that collateral (or “margin”) could further reduce exposure irrespective of the insolvency of the counterparty – but this in reality is nothing new. Secured parties are generally always preferred (to the extent of the collateral pledged to them) as against general unsecured creditors.
March 8, 2009 9:16 AM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks for your explanation. It is certainly helpful. I've read it several times to let it sink in. It's worthy of study.
I'm still left befuddled by the magnitude of what confronts us here. It certainly seems that the ideas may have been good but that the risks were totally underestimated. I am left feeling that many participants weren't completely aware of the systemic interrelationships. They also failed to recognize the likelihood of human avarice and downright dishonesty. At best, it is complex; at worst, it shields malfeasance.
Ben Stein, (to whom I don't generally pay attention) suggested one rule in his NYTimes column this morning that makes sense: "Don’t allow speculators with no insurable interest to buy credit-default swaps on bonds." Somehow or other, it sounds like this might well be expanded to preclude more third party relationships in such transactions.
Thanks again for your well-written and helpful explanation.
March 8, 2009 10:15 AM | Reply | Permalink
I'm still trying to get my mind around this complex question and I have come up with another stumbling block.
Why should such products as CDS have priority over other debtors in the event of bankruptcy? It seems to me that in the Herstatt example you gave the result was that the first party to the transaction was simply S.O.L. just like all the other unsecured creditors of the bank when it was shut down. What is it that gives the bank the right to go to the head of the line? It seems to me that they might very well be able to survive the loss better than employees who did not receive checks. Other than a skillfully lobbied bill which established their precedence in the heirarchy of creditors what should give them the right to be at the head of the line? I understand that such new transactions/products may have need to be included somewhere in the pecking order of bankruptcy claimants but why first?
In the process of trying to better understand these products I came across an eye-opening list of products which all deserve some attention: Forms for Financial Products.
I am sure that those who work with them every day have some idea of what these are but they are far from most people's understanding. They are beyond normal items in the lexicon like put and call options. And I suspect that most are totally unregulated.No financial product should exist without some form of regulation and transparency including supervision of risk. I can't imagine the whole house of cards coming down if we were to figure out a way to do without many of these transactions.
No wonder everyone is scared. Almost no one really knows where their $$s are. And the people who know aren't telling.
March 8, 2009 9:34 PM | Reply | Permalink
"...but I’m not comfortable with attacking peoples’ motivations until it is shown they were intentionally acting contrary to the interests of the financial system."
Hmm.
What ARE the interests of the financial system?
Perhaps you'd get different answers...depending on who you ask?
Probably part of the problem.
March 8, 2009 11:58 PM | Reply | Permalink
All anyone really needs to know is that a woman named Brooksley Born wanted to regulate these derivatives under the CFTC, and Robert Rubin vetoed it. That decision is what brought all this on.
March 8, 2009 9:51 AM | Reply | Permalink
Right -- not that Phil Gramm personally shepherded through the legislation that made this entire trade completely unregulated. Which means no reporting requirement, which is why the whole world market freaked out when it went bad, because no one knew who was holding the toxic crap. The whole vast complex problem boils down to one brief moment that can be blamed on a Democrat. And that's all anyone needs to know. It's funny how shooter's posts are all really the same post.
March 8, 2009 4:43 PM | Reply | Permalink
If they change their name, their new name should be followed with, "formerly known as the International Swaps and Derivitives Association." Just like, "formerly known as Prince." What ever it is called, it is still representing toxic products.
March 8, 2009 10:34 AM | Reply | Permalink
Much of the mangled language involved in this discussion was developed to get around the fact that was was involved was pure gambling, as opposed to investing. The rest was intended to obfuscate so as to prevent anyone from noticing that laws were being ignored, if not outright broken. Imagine what would have happened if, instead of "credit default swaps", the word "insurance" had been used. My guess is that those involved with AIG, who didn't bail out early, dearly wish now that they had called it "insurance".
March 8, 2009 11:41 AM | Reply | Permalink
Gambling yes, but in some cases the house taking the bets (AIG) had no money to repay. This latter activity is fraud, pure and simple.
March 8, 2009 12:13 PM | Reply | Permalink
Agreed. AND - just a hunch here - the guys at AIG running this scam also figured that if "it" ever did "hit the fan"...the Fed Reserve and Treasury dudes (who are part of that whole incestuous Wall Street culture) would be there to rescue. (Along with a few friends on Capitol Hill.)
I mean, not hard to do, right?
March 9, 2009 12:08 AM | Reply | Permalink
I'm going to take an unfashionable stance here, and for me, an unusual one. I think this is basically good law.
I think what this represents is the only significant brake on derivatives that we've seen since they were deregulated in 2000.
But I have two big questions. The first is why ISDA would have pushed for a law that would make any rational person hesitate before agreeing to sell a derivative (i.e. insure junk). The other real question in my mind is why the hedge funds, er, banks went on peddling derivatives even after this law was passed. Perhaps they thought they were immune from bankruptcy?
On a related note, I want to know why we're continuing to bail out AIG when what's really being bailed out is the European banking industry that AIG insured with derivatives. Talk about moral hazard. They were way more deregulated, way more leveraged and way more reckless even than our own banksters, and now we're picking up the tab alone without the involvement of EU governments.
March 8, 2009 12:17 PM | Reply | Permalink
Even people motivated to insure stability in the Financial System were not necessarily, and almost certainly NOT, doing anything admirable.
If the whole system was false and meant to grossly benefit big players and institutional actors, and almost always worked against the avg. american.....then even doing great good for the financial systems was not a GOOD thing.
There is no such thing as a Wall St maven, lobbyist, or trade group that was looking out for anything other than it's big players. Even a good Centurion who looks after his soldiers well and does them good service, is doing ill if his legion is employed doing an Evil Emperor's will. Or a good Panzer mechanic who loves his family, but keeps the tanks rolling into Poland.
If that is unfair, then it is the Wall Street Mavens and Lobbyists and Trade Groups fault. You can't do 95% bad shit, then try to stand on the 5% good you claim to have done.
March 8, 2009 12:43 PM | Reply | Permalink
Ontologically Impaired's explanation of the importance of close-out netting is better than any explanation I ever could have provided, so I won't attempt to add anything to it.
On a more general level, it's worth noting that special treatment for derivatives in bank resolutions is nothing new: in old-fashioned FDIC receiverships (which everyone seems to love right now), "qualified financial contracts" (QFCs) -- e.g., securities contracts and derivatives -- are also given special treatment. The carve-out for derivatives in the 2005 bankruptcy bill was, in part, just a way to extend the FDIC model to the major bank holding companies (JPM, Lehman, etc.) that aren't covered by the FDIC resolution process.
March 8, 2009 9:36 PM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks, EOC, for the further elucidation.
Did the carveout for derivatives provide some protection for the major bank holding companies without any increase in supervision? Shouldn't the two go hand-in-hand? It seems if we aren't going to supervise the instruments then we shouldn't be in the business of protecting them. I think that seems to be at the heart of people's distress with the present situation. Heads I get all the profits; tails the people bail me out. Hard to beat that kind of deal.
Which brings up another thought: If an economic enterprise in a market economy is too big to fail, isn't it also too big to exist? It seems to me that one of the objectives in dealing with the problems of the financial community should be to breakup the large bank holding companies so that they no longer would be too big to fail.
Breaking them up would provide two benefits: 1) each component would own the risk of their own actions and not be able to expect any bailout and therefore would be more prudent in their risk taking; and 2) the smaller components would be easier to manage than the huge enterprises which have too many moving parts to be managed properly. Forcing mergers on the industry seems to me to be ultimately counterproductive.
March 8, 2009 11:31 PM | Reply | Permalink
Sigh. I've read it over several times now, and it still makes about as much sense to me as if it were written in Old Frisian.
March 9, 2009 1:28 AM | Reply | Permalink
Once again, EOC's elucidation is spot on and informed. I personally think a lot of you others are still missing a key, and actually very simple, point . . . as is Josh. It's just my opinion but I think a lot of you are getting lost in the weeds -- the more you bushwhack away the more lost you'll get.
The idea was not to favor big evil banks over everyone else. What good does it do any of us if one bank takes down other major players in the financial system if they are their counterparties? The idea was to protect us all by minimizing impact to liquidity and the balance sheets of counterparties.
I think it's ironic that even Josh has strongly made a very similar argument in a different context: the automobile companies. They, too, made very stupid mistakes in terms of strategy and management - but Josh thinks it's insanity not to bail them out. Why? Not to protect or reward management of the auto companies, but to save jobs and a key U.S. strategic industry.
With the banks, and ISDA's efforts, the purpose was essentially the same. It profits none of us to expose the financial system to contagion effect of one counterparty going down if that can be avoided through simple mechanisms like netting arrangements, which, by the way, as EOC points out, have been in place for federally regulated banks per the FDIC a long time.
Here is a great explanation from the FDIC's website of what the Bankruptcy reform Act was supposed to accomplish if you want to continue to wade deep into the bush . . . (the FDIC has fantastic resources on financial law and regulation by the way):
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2005/101105fyi.html
I should point out that some of you are stumbling into territory that will prove more enlightening - particularly jimbonita. He may now progress to the next level of training: the Basle accord. If you really want to understand what went wrong, this is where you need to expend your energy. I'm afraid Josh has led people down a blind alley of populist rage that will get them nowhere - the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005 is not the problem. The problem was no one taking capital regulation seriously and - yes (as jimbonita is starting to figure out) - this holds true with respect to CDSs and other forms of OTC instruments.
March 9, 2009 6:13 AM | Reply | Permalink
the ISDA must be shaking in its loafers over the possibility of stronger regulation passing Congress this year.
This is comedy on steroids.
ISDA is in essence a bunch of derivative lawyers who work on contractual issues to ensure the smooth functioning of derivative markets. I love TPM and it's reporting, but I've gotta tell you, going after ISDA to get at the securities firms would have been like going after FASB to get at Al Capone.
If ISDA did lobby for certain netting provisions in the bankruptcy bill, it would have been done with the aim of providing some stability in the event of a large counterparty failing. And given how efficiently this part of the Lehman business has been cleaned up (there are fewer than 400 derivative contracts outstanding), ISDA appear to have done a decent job.
Ironically, though, the ISDA sanctioned CDS auction, which valued Lehman debt at around 12 cents in the dollar, is what all but crashed the whole mothership. But that wasn't ISDA's fault... unless someone thinks they rigged the outcome...
March 9, 2009 7:49 AM | Reply | Permalink
Some of you sound deeply 'invested' in ISDA or at least with sympathetic adjuncts in the Finance World.
Calling Josh a Rage Populist is much worse than anything he called you.
Seems to me anybody criticizing the utter corrupt collapse of what used to be America qualifies as a populist to you. And you seem to attach Faux, Fake, and Rage whenever POPULIST get's typed. The only fake populism is somebody who played for the big boys, but acts all outraged after the fact.
If you are for the mass of people, you are populist. If you never played for the big boys, and are just an average Joe in Capitalist America...then there is no such thing as Faux Populism.
Why don't you answer Josh's main assertion....that Finance became the Big Playa instead of just the Servicing Branch of American Capitalism? How 'bout you answer my similar assertion that all the Big Players sitting on all our money, trading it overnight with the asian markets on the sly, turning decent mortgages into crap swaps, emptying pension funds, lobbying against unions and fair wage laws, lobbying for CDS and every other shady practice....were playing games with OUR MONEY? How is it that I can mess with YOUR cash? I am not sitting on a huge electronic pile of YOUR MONEY. I can't move it here, swap it there, stuff my pockets, lose what is left, then come crying for bailouts.
The Populi have a point.
March 9, 2009 9:22 AM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks, DickTater: I don't think of myself as being deeply invested in ISDA at all. As I said I have no particular axe to grind. My only interest is in fixing what's broken, not what's not broken. My fear is that uninformed populism will just hurt us all, including the populi. Which, by the way, was Josh's approach when it came to the auto industry.
That said, I do think there was a self-interested cabal responsible for this mess: as I said, the deregulation crowd definitely bears much responsibility - but that has little to do with the close-out netting in ISDA agreements. And Basel II turned out to be a joke when it came to capital regulation. If banks were required to assess and address risk correctly, we wouldn't be in this mess. It's that simple.
March 9, 2009 11:10 AM | Reply | Permalink
OK, Ontologically Impaired. I do not understand ISDA, or close-out netting. Please forgive me this long ramble. On The finer points of ISDA and other financial manoevers ....you may be perfectly correct. In no way do I mean to dismiss your knowledge of these areas. I appreciate your acknowledgement of the wrongdoing we have been subjected to.
I have very little patience for the details of a failed and corrupt system. The quicker we scrap the whole thing and get on with a simpler, more regulated system - the better.
I do know that we are throwing money down a hole, trying to prop up and "save" a system which is going down anyways. Why not spend that money and energy NOW to build a new system and kill-off the old system AND IT'S CHIEFS....rather than empty our treasury and future treasury trying to save an old paradigm that will have to be replaced anyways?
Regardless if there are relative innocents in the ISDA and current system, that system is dead. I guess it just doesn't know it yet and neither does Geithner, Obama, et al.
It robbed 100's of millions of people of 100's of billions of dollars. The people who ran it are bankrupt...morally and leadership-wise. They pocketed the massive profits. They saddle us with the massive debts. They ride off barely chastened...let alone prosecuted.
Why should we "save" the system? What good would stability do US for a massively corrupt and ruinous system? Repeat the whole last 30 years?
There is no stability. There is no "return" to stability, except to rewind the current monster and let it toddle off a cliff again. There is already tremendous damage and loss.
It is not populism to recognize this, or to want accountability. Is "rabid" or "mindless" populism any more dangerous than our already incredibly unfair, focused, larcenous, unaccountable, nation-destroying system? Nobody expects banks and lending and insurance to be run, in the future, by mob rule. What the people want, even if they can't verbalize it properly, is the current structure torn down, the guilty prosecuted, and a new regulated and govt. overseen structure to replace it.
I don't want chaos or mob rule. OK, maybe I do. But I knew back in 1980 when HMOs got their start in Minnesota, and again when 401ks (both tied to corporate employment) and when Privatizing Social Security, and again when Buusch and tort reform and bankruptcy laws and rampant credit card predation and no-down home loans that we were on the road to hell.
We have 30 years of absolute carnivorous, orchestrated, destruction visited on us by the 3-Piece-Suit gang. Prob. more than 30 years. There is no end with these guys. It never ends. They dream up better and grander schemes to get larger pools of our money together, then steal it all. The only thing that stops them is utter insolvency. Once we gain a little solvency, the whole cycle repeats.
Arguing over the smaller points of ISDA and close-out netting is hardly helpful, I fear, although I recognize that was what started this thread and I am going beyond the scope of the thread. But small steps and half-measures and trying to stabilize the inexorable downward spiral here is not what is called for. An absolute clearing of the decks, with all it's attendant loss, is necessary. In the end, it will be less painful. If we do not, we may find we have NOTHING LEFT with which to start again. We may have NOTHING in the tank when the realization finally sets in that a new paradigm is required. And I guess that is what the powers-that-be on Wall St. recognize....but true to form they are sucking our tanks dry while we go down. They know nothing else.
To return to your points....recognizing that amputation is necessary is not populism. Naming the disease is not populism. Not having all the answers and not being an insider is not populism. Being angry at the fairly small subset of Americans who guided us into this swirling, sucking whirlpool of destruction is not populism. Being astounded by the greed and magnitude of loss is not populism. Wanting accountability, even if it is applied unevenly, is not populism. And those folks who are voicing these feelings are just voicing their opinions (not setting failed policies)...and are not necessarily GUILTY of anything even if they are not perfectly correct on every point.
I think the alternative to Populist Outrage is jaded fatalism, or worse - siding with the status quo. I guess jaded fatalism is the camp I am in because I don't think we will make the right choices no matter what. We have at least 60 years of making the wrong choice, everytime, on our National Resume. Our whole idea of ourselves, our place on earth, our mission as a country and even individuals seems sorely misguided. We have managed to greatly damage the only place in the known galaxy that can sustain us. Returning to the Stone Age seems probably the most humane thing we could do for ourselves and Mother Earth.
March 9, 2009 12:22 PM | Reply | Permalink